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Roderick Hudson’s declaration “I am a Hellenist; I am not a Hebraist!” (RH 94) 
reflects in Arnoldian terms his determination to be ruled by Hellenism’s “spontaneity 
of consciousness” rather than Hebraism’s “strictness of conscience” (Arnold 467).1 
Though gesturing toward a separation between these two critical terms and attitudes 
in his earliest published novel, Henry James later draws on the fertile overlap between 
conscience and consciousness in orienting narrative ethics. Through the 1880s and 
1890s, he devotes increasing attention to the interior consciousness of his protago-
nists and to the communication of this consciousness via focalization—mediating 
and limiting narrative point of view through a character’s point of view. By his final 
trivium, The Wings of the Dove (1902), The Ambassadors (1903), and The Golden 
Bowl (1904), narrative consciousness sometimes verges on individual conscious-
ness, perhaps most thoroughly in Lambert Strether, the protagonist and focalizer of 
The Ambassadors. In The Ambassadors, narrative consciousness squeezes into—is 
refracted and focalized through—what Percy Lubbock early recognized as “Strether’s 
intervening consciousness” (170), or what James’s narrator characterizes as Strether’s 
“double consciousness” (AB 18). Conscience, too, features prominently in this novel, 
both as the particularly moral aspect of consciousness and as a reflection of James’s 
strict New England moral sensibilities, as Austin Warren observes. But while Strether’s 
consciousness, associated with his irrepressible conscience, forms the novel’s focal 
point, moral impositions in the narrative are not his alone. Entwined, “conscience” 
and “consciousness” in The Ambassadors, beyond destabilizing the novel’s epistemol-
ogy, more specifically foreground the solipsistic torque of the narrator’s focalization 
on the novel’s ethics. 
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The question of how James communicates morality and ethics has generated 
some recent forceful criticism by the likes of Robert Pippin, Martha Nussbaum, and 
J. Hillis Miller (Literature), the first two on ethics in The Ambassadors in particular. It 
is between the last two, however, that I want to examine a critical lacuna, suggesting 
a companion—and complementary—view. While Miller’s emphasis on speech acts in 
Henry James figures the narrative itself as an ethical act, Nussbaum sees reading, in 
James especially, as “a preparation for a life that is lived at one remove from life” (188). 
Nussbaum’s emphasis on the importance of “perception” and “reflection” in ethics is 
very close to my own, but I want to extend an observation of hers, coming closer to 
Miller’s position of the intrinsic ethic activity of narrative. Nussbaum claims, in the 
context of what she calls “open-ended inquiry” through Strether, “that procedures 
themselves are value-laden” (186). I examine James’s procedure of focalization as a 
way—not necessarily of a reader’s perceiving (as Nussbaum) or of a narrator’s enact-
ing (as Miller)—but of a narrator’s and a character’s together creating consciousness 
attentive to, and gripped by, ethics.
Beyond presenting the narrative through Strether’s viewpoint, the narrator em-
phasizes repeatedly—through the use of reflexive pronouns, verbs of perception, and 
counterfactual musings like “as if”—that Strether’s consciousness is not just perceived 
but imagined, even created. Concordantly, narrative focalization foregrounds the radi-
cally subjective force not only in Strether’s consciousness but also in his conscience, 
presenting moral dilemmas as uniquely individual. Beyond depicting the power and 
longevity of Strether’s individual conscience, the narrative, in its often restricted focal-
ization through him, mobilizes ethics only insofar as he has perceived and conceived 
the world. What Strether does not realize in his consciousness can hardly influence 
his conscience: even so, what the narrator does not focalize through Strether bears 
little on the novel’s ethics. I do not propose that James’s narrator is necessarily or 
altogether ethical or that the narrator has an ethical axe to grind. On the contrary, 
I emphasize how narrative focalization makes ethics central for the characters and 
then how ethics is created within the minds of those characters. 
Some description of focalization at the outset will illuminate more precisely its 
potency in framing and mediating consciousness and conscience, epistemology and 
ethics.2 While Wayne Booth explores the division between narrator and “implied 
author” in The Rhetoric of Fiction, structuralist narratologists, who did much to 
develop the study of focalization, investigate the distance between “teller” and “seer,” 
specifically giving room for a focalizer. Rather than interpreting the “intention” and 
“meaning” of a story through the chain of author, implied author, narrator, or character, 
focalization mediates the “intention” of a story primarily through author, narrator, 
focalizer, and character, thereby centering the bulk of interpretation between narra-
tor and character—with focalizer as a crux between the two—rather than between 
author and narrator. While a single point of view for Booth might accurately describe 
a story’s orientation, structuralist narratology asserts the importance of at least two 
points of view—that of the focalizer, who sees the action, and that of the narrator, 
who sees and reports the seer—to cooperate or even to compete in the communica-
tion of a story. Perhaps more fundamentally, Booth’s inquiry into what the author 
“meant” becomes a more singular quest to explore narrative method. 
Scholars of narrative have long proposed a split between the narrative func-
tions of seeing, via a focalizer, and telling, via a narrator. Whereas the narrator in 
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traditional fiction most often functions as seer of the action as well as teller, focaliza-
tion separates the narrative operations of telling and seeing. “[V]erbs of perception, 
cognition, and emotion,” are “used to signal the active, ongoing deciphering of what 
is being narrated,” explains David Herman, “its refraction through some character-
perceiver’s or character-knower’s perspective” (308). In focalization, James stretches 
the third-person narrator beyond more traditional, singularly omniscient or limited 
perspectives, mediating a third-person narrator’s story from the limited perspective of 
a character. As in the case of first-person narration, the sections of The Ambassadors 
focalized through Strether restrict knowledge to a single character, but, unlike the 
first-person narrator, the focalizer does not retain control of his objects or moments 
of perception. 
Shortly after he arrives in Europe as the “ambassador” of the title to retrieve 
Chad Newsome for his mother, Strether himself is described through the focaliza-
tion of his incipient romantic interest, Maria Gostrey. James’s narrator foregrounds 
a deeply subjective kind of focalization by penetrating beyond what (a) “his hostess 
saw,” to (b-c) “what she might have taken in with a vision kindly adjusted . . .” (20, 
emphasis mine). To employ Nieragden’s modification of Bal’s and Genette’s classifica-
tion systems: the narrator deftly transitions from (a) “figural exoperceptive” narration, 
focusing via a character’s perception, to (b) “narratorial exoperceptive” narration, 
focusing via the narrator’s perspective, which simultaneously presents the narrator’s 
imagination of (c) “figural isoperceptive” narration, focusing via a character’s poten-
tially self-reflexive perspective (695). Following Gostrey’s perception of Strether, the 
narrator describes her actions (“She waited for him”) and correspondingly describes 
her through Strether’s own focalization: “his consciousness of it [Gostrey’s ‘perfect 
plain propriety’] was instantly acute” (20, emphasis mine). In both of these cases, as 
is common through the novel, Strether is described not directly by the narrator but 
by the narrator’s report of another’s view, or by Strether’s own self-reflection.
While J. Hillis Miller chides some scholars of narrative who “take more delight 
in subtle refinements of distinction among various forms of ‘focalization’ than in 
demonstrating how these formal features are related to meaning” (“Focalization” 
125), his critique serves predominantly to refine and extend the work of narratology. 
James, with a similar emphasis on practical meaning and technique in his preface 
to The Golden Bowl, describes his focalizing characters as “the impersonal author’s 
concrete deputy or delegate” (xli), seeing them as a way for him to “get down into 
the arena and do my best to live and breathe and rub shoulders and converse with 
the persons engaged in the struggle” (xliii). Despite the complex vocabulary that has 
grown up around narratology and focalization, as suggested in Nieragden’s terms (or 
Bal’s, which Nieragden is refining), much of its usefulness emerges, at its most concrete 
level, from specific textual indicators such as verb types (as in Miss Gostrey’s above 
focalization), descriptions of “consciousness” (as in Strether’s above focalization), and 
other stylistic elements. The attention to pronouns, distancing language, verb mood 
and tense involves close stylistic analysis—and its emphasis on minutiae of language 
and syntax—with narratalogical analysis, giving greater precision to narratalogy and 
greater scope for stylistics. 
Using stylistics as a manner of assessing narrative technique may seem unduly 
cavalier, positing wide-ranging claims about entire texts’ narrative structures with small 
bits of evidence. Perhaps as dangerously, this method may seem to offer distinct, even 
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diverging, inquiries into James, paired only at the expense of interpretive consistency. 
J. Hillis Miller’s study of speech acts as ethical indicators in Literature as Conduct3 
offers ample illustration, however, of the power—ethical and otherwise—of single 
words and phrases threaded through a Jamesian text. In his analysis of The Wings of 
the Dove, for example, Miller argues convincingly for the importance of the phrase 
“There you are!” and the even briefer interjection, “Oh!” “It is so rich in meaning 
and in ambiguous performative force that each ‘Oh!’” he reasons, “might require an 
interminable commentary” (199). While attending specifically to the performative 
potency of language, Miller indicates further significant facets of the phrase “There 
you are!,” noting that it “puts together a deictic, a pronoun shifter, and a present tense 
version of the verb to be to make an exceedingly ambiguous and untranslatable idiom” 
(195). Beyond the ambiguities of deixis and pronoun that Miller observes, this phrase 
also identifies a particular point of view and, given the frequent exclamation mark, a 
particular attitude regarding that point of view. Outside of denoting a Jamesian nar-
rator’s point of view, “There you are!” highlights a particular character’s perspective, 
orienting the unnamed “here” by the position of the speaker. Strether’s exclamation 
“Then there we are!” to end The Ambassadors (365), furthermore, while shifting to 
a plural, first-person pronoun, indicates an agreement only that Maria and he must 
differ so long as Strether, and his conscience, have the final word.
As Miller and many others like Ian Watt and Terry Eagleton have recognized, 
James often communicates his multifaceted point of view via a complex network of 
small-scale linguistic structures.4 “A narrating situation is,” Genette writes, “a com-
plex whole within which analysis, or simply description, cannot differentiate except 
by ripping apart a tight web of connections among the narrating act, its protagonists, 
its spatio-temporal determinations, its relationship to the other narrating situations 
involved in the same narrative” (215). As Genette suggests, stylistics contributes 
perhaps most noticeably to James’s “narrating act” in that the details of phrasing 
and sentence structure in communication reveal something of the “spatio-temporal 
determinations,” orientation, and perspective of the storyteller. Through his deploy-
ment of carefully wrought micro-changes in stylistics, sentence structures, and simile, 
James’s narrative technique in his later fiction creates a shifting dynamism between 
his narrator and focalizing characters. This focalization in turn registers or refracts 
macro-changes initiated by Strether’s geographic displacement, conflict with society’s 
mores, feelings of guilt, and his exploration of fuller experience, as reflected in his 
important speech to Little Bilham. 
Two contrasting examples, in late and early James respectively, illustrate the 
impact of stylistics on narrative focalization. In The Golden Bowl, for example, when 
the Prince “found himself believing that, really, futility would have been forgiven him” 
(13). Stylistic elements—the narrator’s reflexive pronoun (“himself”), verb of sensa-
tion (“found”), and subjunctive mood (“would have been”)—inform the narrative 
distance between narrator and focalizer, inasmuch as the Prince’s own actions are 
reported not directly by the narrator, but indirectly by the narrator only as they have 
been processed in the mind of the Prince. In James’s earlier The Portrait of a Lady 
(1881), by contrast, the narrator normally does not focalize information through an-
other character. Even when Lord Warburton is doubtlessly evaluating Isabel Archer’s 
physical beauty, the narrator reports only that “he may have been mistaken at this 
point” (254), an assertion of uncertainty that could have been undergirded by a more 
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complex, subjective narrative framework of focalization. Had James added an infini-
tive and a reflexive pronoun in the phrase “he supposed/thought/considered himself 
to have been mistaken,” for instance, he could further have distanced his narrator 
from the action and refracted certainty through another character. 
Analyzing textual details in this minute, language-focused mode suggests shared 
methodologies between narrative structuralism and, argues Dan Shen, poetry. “The 
stylistic analysis of prose fiction is not much different from the stylistic analysis of 
poetry,” Shen asserts (139). “Narratological analysis of prose fiction has departed 
from the poetic analytical tradition, focusing attention on the relation between story 
events and their rearrangement.” Nonetheless, Shen proposes reintegrating the types 
of analysis often reserved in contemporary criticism respectively for prose and poetry. 
This emphasis on stylistics and minutiae of language in examining focalization, fur-
thermore, helps anchor the potentially, and potentially dangerously, ethereal inquiries 
into James’s epistemology and its specific inflection in ethics. 
Epistemology emerges in the opening sentences of The Ambassadors, as Strether’s 
ignorance and consequent surprise do not make him “wholly disconcerted” (17) at the 
end of sentence one and a telegram makes his plans “sound” by the end of sentence 
two. Further description of characters’ (especially Strether’s) consciousnesses, thought 
processes, and reasoning foregrounds the interior world of the mind and epistemology 
throughout the novel. Beyond characters’ perspectives and thoughts, the narrator makes 
reference to perspectives not identified with any character but potential, anonymous, 
counterfactual. In the above-quoted initial description of Strether focalized through 
Maria, for instance, the narrator reports not just “what his hostess saw” but “what 
she might have taken in with a vision kindly adjusted . . .” (20, emphasis mine). The 
verbs of sensation (“saw,” “taken in”) and the subjunctive mood (“might have”), 
more than signaling distance between narrator and focalizer, indicate the fabricating 
power of narrative epistemology, particularized in character consciousness.
The phrase “as if” in The Ambassadors similarly signals a narrative shift into 
imagined, counterfactual perception, collapsing the trigger of simile (“as”) into the 
subjunctive verb mood. One of the hallmarks of the literary imagination, simile encases 
imagined reality in the language of tangible phenomena, fabricating a substitute for 
reality. In Strether’s conversation with Chad’s secret beloved, Madame de Vionnet, in 
Book Nine, for instance, the narrator recalls that they “talked most conveniently—as 
if they had had no chance yet” (264). Two sentences later, the narrator similarly elides 
simile with counterfactual: “She made him,” James writes, “as under the breath of 
some vague western whiff, homesick and freshly restless” (264). The phrase “as if” 
initially functions as a focalization of experience through some possible viewer, not 
necessarily character or narrator. But “as if” in this chapter ultimately produces a 
world fabricated in Strether’s consciousness. When Strether just earlier in the scene 
sees Sarah Pocock’s name and address, it is “as if he had been looking hard into her 
mother’s face, and he turned from it as if the face had declined to relax. But since it 
was in a manner as if Mrs. Newsome were thereby all the more, instead of the less, 
in the room, and were conscious, sharply and solely conscious, of himself, so he felt 
both held and hushed, summoned to stay at least and take his punishment” (259–60, 
emphasis mine). The “as ifs” turn this focalization from the actual into the potential, 
the subjectively fabricated. While Strether distances himself from Sarah’s abrasive pres-
ence, a proxy for his stifling patron Mrs. Newsome’s, the consciousness he constructs 
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makes him ever more aware of Mrs. Newsome’s virtual presence. Perhaps because of 
the vague perceptions of external reality, his interior perceptions intensify—uncov-
ered and therefore emphasized through focalization. Further, as his consciousness is 
sharpened, his conscience, his moral sensitivity, makes him stay for his “punishment,” 
however subjectively conceived. The sheer arbitrariness of his conscience emphasizes 
its power, intensified rather than diffused by his perception of exterior phenomena, 
additionally underlining the far-reaching effects of focalized simile. 
Perhaps as an antidote or counterweight to the superabundant mental events, 
James’s characters focus on physical objects to orient their minds, but, even then, 
James emphasizes the necessary element of subjective perception and fabrication. Like 
Milly Theale in The Wings of the Dove, who considers how “the smallest things, the 
faces, the hands, the jewels of the women, the sound of words, especially of names, 
across the table, the shape of the forks, the arrangement of the flowers, the attitude 
of the servants, the walls of the room, were all touches in a picture and denotements 
in a play” (149), Strether fashions his own drama when considering Maria Gostrey’s 
red velvet band. When Strether conscientiously catches “himself in the act” of per-
ceiving this band, it becomes “a starting-point for fresh backward, fresh forward, 
fresh lateral flights” (AB 43). If the narrator were also the focalizer here, the mode 
usual for contemporary fiction, the narrative might perhaps pass over these memories 
and speculations. Strether’s focalizing mind, however, takes a turn into some of these 
backward and forward “flights,” which present new perspectives and ways of seeing, 
particularly, Strether’s own. These flights are, to the narrator, speculations (I emphasize 
the Latin root), but for Strether, new perspectives, literally a “looking-through” to 
new possibilities, to alternative and counterfactual consciousness. 
While it is doubtful that Strether’s reveries on Gostrey could be of much use to 
the plot or structure of the narrative, they interrupt the narrative structure so that as 
the story has moved in story-time from past to future it has also shifted and disori-
ented his sense of concrete time as “all sorts of things in fact now seemed to come 
over him. . . . It came over him for instance that Miss Gostrey looked perhaps like 
Mary Stuart” (43, 44). This circuitous reflection summons a historical figure without 
direct narrative allusion or character’s speech, revealing a unique side of Strether’s 
knowledge and experience rather than a highbrow narrator or pretentious character. 
Given Strether’s recollection in the previous paragraph that he had likened his im-
perious patron Mrs. Newsome to England’s Queen Elizabeth, his tacit comparison 
of Gostrey to the sixteenth-century Scottish Queen Mary Stuart must seem anything 
but off-hand. These paired, contemporary, historical references—parallel in Strether’s 
mind to the two iconic women in his own life—summon a sixteenth-century world, 
complete with dueling monarchs. Beyond emblematically introducing these dominant 
women, Strether’s world-creating references reveal the utterly solipsistic—and solip-
sizing—power of his consciousness.
In addition to building an alternate epistemology, a virtual world, through sub-
junctives and other counterfactuals, focalization affects epistemology and individual 
consciousness in its interplay with narrative limitation and uncertainty. “For James, 
what we call knowledge can only be a function of how we look at our experience, 
and how we look at the looking of others,” observes Peter Rawlings. “He constructs 
limited centers of consciousness not only as an acknowledgement of this, but as the 
very means of dramatizing the processes involved” (45). James’s insertion of an ex-
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tra mediator between the knowledge of action and the telling of that action further 
refracts the communication of that knowledge. And, since that refraction occurs in a 
limited character’s consciousness and not in an omniscient narrator or creator-author, 
the knowledge may be less than complete not just because the author or narrator 
chooses not to communicate the knowledge but perhaps because the character is 
unaware or unsure of that knowledge. The question of “who knows what” in James, 
perhaps more than the simpler “what is known,” therefore functions centrally in his 
epistemology and its communication.
Like The Ambassadors in its focalizing complexity, The Golden Bowl, carved 
into two books named after and focalized principally through the “Prince” and 
“Princess,” displays in its very construction the partition between and among the 
“whos” and their knowledge, between individual consciousness and more general 
epistemology. While the opening of the novel records the Prince’s expansive thoughts 
about London’s relation to royal Rome, as he thinks of “Imperium” and the “loot 
of far-off victories” (3), the princess first focalizes (“that was what she had felt”) 
her own restrictive reflections of “her existence in the space left her for circulation, 
a space that sometimes seemed ample and sometimes narrow” (299). The splits in 
perspective proliferate beyond these two characters, however, illustrating the power 
and mystery of varied epistemologies. 
In a description of Charlotte Stant in chapter 3, for instance, the narrator’s bland 
and nearly hostile description of Charlotte’s face as “too narrow and long” contrasts 
with the Prince’s description of her: “He knew her narrow hands, he knew her long 
fingers and the shape and colour of her finger-nails, he knew her special beauty of 
movement and line when she turned her back, and the perfect working of all her main 
attachments, that of some wonderful finished instrument, something intently made 
for exhibition, for a prize” (35–36). While the narrator launches into a quick and 
comprehensive critique, listing grievances against her face, eyes, and mouth in the 
first sentence of description, the Prince at first takes up only one item at a time: her 
“thick hair,” her “free arms,” and then her “narrow hands,” as quoted above. Not 
until he has remarked on some figures in detail will the Prince move into this more 
comprehensive and yet compact description of Charlotte, suggesting that he has taken 
more time to examine or to comment on her than has the narrator. Still further, the 
narrator proposes a fictional focalizer to view the father, Adam Verver, who “might 
have been observed to open the door of the billiard-room with a certain freedom” 
(92). The subjunctive mood (“might have been”), while complicating the narrative 
structure, more importantly adds a non-existent focalizer’s perspective, an external and 
indefinable mind, to the circulation of knowledge. While James’s reflexive pronouns 
most often affirm characters’ self-knowledge, the subjunctive mood, significant in The 
Ambassadors as in The Golden Bowl, occludes knowledge of perspective and therefore 
of the possibility of knowing the postulated focalizer’s reliability. These combating 
products of his focalization manifest an intrinsic ambiguity in James’s particular late 
style of focalization, proceeding into characters’ minds but then deflecting that ingress 
in diverging and sometimes indiscernible directions.5
Taking interpretation of James perhaps one more step, beyond physically non-
existent focalizers, Ruth Yeazell posits the importance of the nonexistent or excluded 
discourse. “What the characters refuse to talk about, what they refuse even to think,” 
she argues, “becomes for us—especially in retrospect—the real substance of James’s 
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fiction” (129). This plethora of “events” located in characters’ consciousnesses often 
clutters the characters’ minds, further complicating the novels’ epistemologies. Rather 
than remaining a problem of the text, an epistemology resulting from James’s multi-
farious narrative perspectives and focalizations impinges on readers too, implicating 
them in the focalizing experience and the characters’ consequent uncertainties. “To 
read the late novels is at least temporarily to share some of that bewilderment,” 
Yeazell asserts. “For like the characters, we too are continuously forced to hover 
somewhere between ignorance and full knowledge, to struggle with intimations and 
possibilities which make themselves obliquely felt” (35; see also Prince 49). Even in 
Strether’s famed speech to Little Bilham, propagating what Robert Pippin calls “a 
very broad, somewhat vague ethic” (158), the direct address seems hardly restricted 
to Bilham but protrudes into narrative didacticism. Given James’s revelation that the 
theme of this speech provided a kernel for the novel, Strether’s emphatic “you” might 
resonate as some sort of authorial didacticism as well (AB 137). Directly following 
this speech, Strether’s assumption of what Pippin calls “the perspective of an other” 
(161) through his use of French reflects his own multiple perspectives. “Impayable, 
as you say, no doubt. But what am I to myself?” (AB 138). Questioning even the 
foundational law of identity (X=X), Strether reflects for the reader a tergiversated 
consciousness and epistemology. 
Aside from this direct address, potentially transferable to readers, the mental 
gymnastics of James’s characters give another model of transferable consciousness, 
as, for example, in the nearly supernatural communication of knowledge between 
Strether and Madame de Vionnet. Even in the midst of an exchange, the narrator 
registers the conversation’s impact on both of them: “The [verbal] picture at any rate 
stirred in her an appreciation that he felt to be sincere” (241). How precisely Strether 
physically discovers her “appreciation” remains unknown, for the narrator reports 
how he “felt,” as epistemology skips from a perceptible to an emotional component. 
Rather than operating within an epistemology informed by the narrator’s comfort-
ably detached perspective, James probes the singular perspectives and consciousnesses 
of his characters. Even as James’s narrator through focalization enters their minds, 
themselves fictional fabrications, these minds also are seen to construct fictions, meta-
phors, and counterfactual worlds. In these focalized worlds, actualized through the 
unspoken speech of imagination, conscience, rather than anything external, becomes 
the solitary ethical standard. 
In a scene almost entirely focalized through Strether in the Luxembourg Gardens 
in Book Two, chapter 2, the narrator pinpoints the radically interiorized operations 
of Strether’s conscience, in both the near and distant past. In reviewing his recent time 
ashore, he recalls that “more than once, during the time, he had regarded himself as 
admonished” (AB 60). Rather than referring directly to society’s censure or to some 
external standard, Strether centers his conscience on his own regard of his actions. 
Reaching further into the past, he brings his past marriage and deceased son into 
conscience’s sphere: “That the memory of the vow of his youth should, in order to 
throb again, have had to wait for this last, as he felt it, of all his accidents—that was 
surely proof enough of how his conscience had been encumbered” (64). Strether im-
plies that his marriage should enjoin throbs of conscience, but the precise reasons for 
this remain veiled. Later in the same paragraph, however, the narrator reports that, 
in the most recent past, Strether’s “conscience had been amusing itself for the forty-
Conscience and Consciousness in The Ambassadors 41
eight hours by forbidding him the purchase of a book” (65). Yet for this comparative 
triviality, Strether’s reasoning seems quite clear: “he held off from that, held off from 
everything; from the moment he didn’t yet call on Chad he wouldn’t for the world 
have taken any other step.” Strether ties this internal paralysis to his ignorance of 
Chad’s situation; and, concordantly, this paralysis incites his protracted analysis of his 
conscience and motivations. Strether’s ethics—and the narrative’s—are determined by 
what Strether makes of events rather than by the seriousness of the events themselves.
Strether’s analysis of his conscience emerges and remains principally within his 
unstable conception of himself, as evidenced in the frequent reflexive pronouns and 
the verbs of perception that litter the middle section of this chapter: “He felt” (61), 
“It seemed” (62), “He appeared to himself,” “He could easily see,” “he considered,” 
“He judged” (63), “He had believed” (64), “Strether had become acquainted,” “He 
remembered.” As these verbs focalize the experience of the action through Strether, 
they limit the viewpoint to perhaps the novel’s most naïve character. One formula in 
particular—“He appeared to himself”—showcases the instability of Strether’s con-
sciousness. The narrator in this clause reports not just Strether’s perceptions, but a 
perception of Strether’s own perceptions, a doubly-inflected focalization that extends the 
activity of perception past the narrator’s focalizing to Strether himself. Even Strether’s 
own self-knowledge can only “appear” to him, revealing an epistemological wariness 
symptomatic of a consciousness working overtime. His uncertainty in reporting his 
own state further indicates, beyond an attendance on fact-checking, an obsession with 
truthful reporting, an effect of conscience that also is clocking extra hours.
Fusing a third-person narrative voice with first-person point of view in his 
focalization through Strether, James associates narrative consciousness and personal 
conscience, adding an automatic moral component to narrative technique, drawing 
consciousness into conscience’s vortex. As Strether hears of Madame de Vionnet’s 
arrangement of marriage for her daughter Jeanne, for example, his “consciously 
gaping a little” (251) supplies a physical manifestation of his shocked conscience, 
purveyed via his “conscious” facial expression. Here, conscience molds the disposition 
of consciousness. Even at the end of the novel, Strether’s rejection of Maria Gostrey 
and European luxury betrays his conscience’s resurgent force. By focalizing through a 
character whose moral sensitivity remains intact, if shaken, James’s narrator purveys 
Strether’s conscience as a persistent moral presence. As his point of view and con-
sciousness become the narrative focus, furthermore, Strether’s conscience becomes the 
monolithic, if not solitary, moral perspective in the novel. In contrast to the permissive 
ethics of Maria or Madame de Vionnet, the narrator’s focus on Strether’s ethics, by 
the novel’s concluding conversation, reflexively refocuses the narrative into concern 
for duty and the “right.”
In the novel’s final page, Strether and Maria’s verbal jousting over the nuances 
of “right” highlights the language of casuistry, a formulaic process for classifying 
and deciding cases of conscience. Done with quibbling over peccadilloes like “the 
purchase of a book” (65), Strether engages in degrees of casuistry he would not have 
dared months earlier, his greater dexterity in moral argument accompanying his more 
expansive consciousness. While Maria emphasizes Strether’s potential gain—“There’s 
nothing,” she says, “I wouldn’t do for you”—Strether responds in the language of 
ethics: “But all the same I must go. . . . To be right” (365). Her stichomythia, “To be 
right?” delivered with “vague deprecation,” reveals her futile attempt to undercut 
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Strether’s conscience, his sense and definition of right. “That, you see, is my only 
logic. Not, out of the whole affair, to have got anything for myself,” he explains, his 
reference to moral logic and insistent stichomythia suggesting his recourse to casuistry 
and conscience.6 Strether’s precise reasons for rejecting Maria’s virtual proposal of 
marriage, while somewhat obscure, reveal his priority of private conscience and the 
self, self-control, and self-denial. 
While noting James’s emphasis on “right,” Martha Nussbaum claims that 
“The Ambassadors and some parts of The Golden Bowl seem too preoccupied with 
getting it right, too much still in the grip of the demand for fine awareness and rich 
responsibility, to welcome love, with its exclusivity and its tumult, as a nourishing 
influence in the ethical life” (53). Somewhat contrary to Nussbaum’s emphasis on 
an admittedly “silent world of love” that must be perceived “around the margins 
of the novel” (52), Robert Pippin explains the potential of Strether’s more austere 
self-renunciation in this scene. In denying material gain, Strether “ends up both with 
nothing,” Pippin reasons, “and yet with everything, the logic of being right and 
therewith having ‘his own life’” (167–68). Pippin’s explication of Strether’s “double 
consciousness” allows room for a consciousness unfulfilled at one point but satisfied 
regarding ethical matters of conscience. Even if Strether’s consciousness has expanded 
through his experiences in Europe by the novel’s conclusion, conscience governs, and 
perhaps surprisingly complements, its enjoyment of that experience. For Strether, the 
status of consciousness and conscience are directly related: greater conscious experi-
ence evokes, even demands, profounder conscience. 
While useful in charting Strether’s developing sense of ethics and discerning the 
specifically ethical component of consciousness, the distinction between conscience 
and consciousness is hardly airtight. Historically, “conscience” in the early modern 
period had denoted both a moral sense of right and wrong and “consciousness,” or 
personal self-knowledge, more generally, and some terminological overlap continued 
into the nineteenth century.7 The connection between these terms extends beyond 
obvious philological similarity to an underlying philosophical debate from Spinoza, 
Leibniz, Locke, and Hume, to the French philosophes, Kant, Kierkegaard, and Ni-
etzsche. “Conscience-consciousness,” Edward Engelberg asserts, “constitutes a major 
dialectic, probed and refined in the course of the last three centuries” (Distance 15). 
In James’s lifetime, Nietzsche connected conscience and consciousness:
the consciousness of this rare freedom, the power over oneself and over 
fate, has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and become in-
stinct, the dominating instinct. What will he call this dominating instinct, 
supposing he feels the need to give it a name? The answer is beyond doubt: 
this sovereign man calls it his conscience. (496)
The very point of specifying this connection between conscience and consciousness 
in James’s narration is, however, contrary to Nietzsche’s emphasis on the “sovereign 
man,” to explore the extent of narrative sovereignty. In Nietzsche, conscience and 
consciousness carry and imply intrinsic human authority. In James’s narrative, by 
contrast, the narrator controls all perception and hence all access to conscience—in 
both its senses.
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As conscience and consciousness in some senses overlap, each term respectively 
manifests variance, such as in the distinction between public and private conscience 
dating at least to the medieval duo of synteresis and conscientia. “Synteresis defined 
one’s voice as the echo of an objective, communal voice,” explains Lowell Gallagher. 
“Conscientia articulated an internally persuasive discourse” (265). The eventual 
folding of both facets into one term contributes to the understanding by James’s era 
that conscience included both private and community-oriented aspects. James re-
flects this parallel in the shared ethical reverberations of individual conscience when 
Strether happens on Chad and Madame de Vionnet during their tryst in the French 
countryside. When Strether and Madame de Vionnet, unbeknownst to Chad, see 
one another, the divide between those who know and the one who remains ignorant 
becomes a divide not just of perception, but of ethics. What Chad does not see cannot 
affect him ethically; but, conversely, as Strether sees, his naivety vanishes: perception 
becomes fertile, creating ethical response and responsibility. This concatenation of 
perception and ethics intensifies the narrative’s focus on ethical matters, folding the 
reader’s perception of Strether inside Strether’s own ethically valenced perception, 
inviting the reader to join the train of ethical focalization and perception modeled by 
both narrator and Strether himself. While Austin Warren argues that here “Strether’s 
conscience has been educated, stretched, as far as it can go” (155) and Robert Garis 
objects that Strether’s realization, “far from being the crowning episode in his educa-
tion, shows on the contrary that there has in fact been no education at all” (307), the 
gradation of conscience’s education is less important here than Strether’s recognition 
that his conscience, whatever its education and whatever the external moral pressure, 
must be—and is—his basis for ethics. 
Moreover, portraying Strether’s mental processes through the metaphors or 
figures of active verbs in this scene, beyond livening the discourse, showcases the 
dynamic, creative possibilities of ethical thought. Strether’s perceptions frame the nar-
rative account as evidenced by constructions in the first two paragraphs like “He had 
dreamed,” “He was quite aware,” and “He observed” (AB 319). More specifically, 
engaging in the isoperceptive focalization that Nieragden describes as the “personal 
identity of subject and object of focalization” (690), James’s narrator in the first four 
paragraphs of Book Eleven, chapter 3, deploys reflexive pronoun constructions in 
conjunction with verbs of perception and action: Strether “found himself” (319), 
“walked as if to show himself” (320), “saw himself partaking,” “lost himself anew” 
(321), and “asked himself.” In some cases, verbs like “found” or “lost” waver between 
perception and action: more ordinarily designating a physical action, they here refer 
to a mental process of imaginative fabrication. 
The consciousness shared by Strether and Madame de Vionnet near the chapter’s 
close creates their reality, apart from Chad’s. Even when he joins in their knowledge, 
the reality of guilt and of Strether’s conscientious response to the couple has solidified. 
The deliberate pacing of this scene, Strether’s initial nonchalance in his sighting of the 
couple, even the narrative’s break between chapters at the very point of recognition, 
lessens the immediate impact. “Neither he nor we are outraged or morally discom-
fited,” writes Pippin. “He had been lied to, but, on the other hand, there was indeed a 
genuine, unavoidable ambiguity in the characterization ‘virtuous’” that Bilham gives 
to the relationship (150). These ambiguities persist into Strether’s more extensive mus-
44 The Henry James Review
ings that night: “He then knew more or less how he had been affected—he but half 
knew at the time” (329). This nocturnal ripening of realization, perhaps surprisingly, 
does not directly incite conscience, at least not the conscience readers might expect 
in Strether, for the scene and Book Eleven end in his reflexive ambiguity: “He found 
himself supposing innumerable and wonderful things” (331). Neither Strether nor 
the narrator seem able to process the defiance of morality revealed in the recognition 
scene, collapsing instead on unspecified thought. James’s narration allows, however, 
that the recognition could have happened another way, or, more specifically, could 
have been seen another way. The sheer arbitrariness of Strether’s wandering on this 
“rambling day” (322) and the narrator’s description that he “found himself” (319) 
getting out of the train and “found himself” talking with a “stout white-capped deep-
voiced woman” (322) imply that the perception might not—under other circumstances, 
specifically other narrative circumstances—have happened at all. And this shift in 
perception would have produced a different, or at least differently conceived, world.
As J. Hillis Miller proposes that the speech acts of The Wings of the Dove “take 
place not in the real world but in a substitute world” and that “The novel’s virtual 
reality has its own specific laws, limitations, and assumptions” (174), so the focalized 
and imagined world of Strether’s consciousness molds his own “laws, limitations, 
and assumptions” into the hardware of existence. While Strether’s conscience, deeply 
interiorized as it is, can hardly make claims on other characters, much less on read-
ers, James’s narrative focalization makes it the command center of a new world, the 
nucleus of a new, narrative life form. His creation of knowledge and virtual reality 
by narrative focalization leads to, and in some way is, a creation of narrative ethics, 
suggesting the narrator as the principal locus of the novel’s ethics, as of its perception. 
And within this focalization, Strether’s further focus on his own actions and thoughts 
proffers a mode and model of interpretation and ethical response not just found, but 
forged, within the novel.
NOTES
1For more on the link between these figures through Roderick Hudson (1875), see Zacharias and 
Engelberg (James). Engelberg extends this work in a 1972 book which includes some discussion of The 
Ambassadors as well (Distance). For more general overviews of their connection, see Raleigh (chapter 1) 
or, more recently, Lustig. Beyond his allusive relationship to Arnold, James acknowledged Arnold as the 
person “that we think of when we figure to ourselves the best knowledge of what is being done in the 
world, the best appreciation of literature and life” (EL 730).
2For development and use of the term “focalization,” see Bal, Onega and Landa, Van Peer and 
Chatman, and, especially, Prince. Miller (“Focalization”) more specifically applies focalization to James, a 
contrast to Tilford’s pre-focalization view, like Booth (“Distance”), who offers yet another pre-focalization 
system of narrative perspective. Also especially relevant to this study is Cohn’s work on narrative and 
consciousness.
3See also Miller’s related work in speech acts and ethics, such as, respectively, “Speech Acts in ‘The 
Aspern Papers’” or The Ethics of Reading.
4Short and Watt mine even the most rudimentary of stylistic elements such as sentence length, sentence 
order, and parentheses as integral facets of James’s narration techniques. More recently, Eagleton similarly 
examines James’s “convoluted later style, with its bafflingly intricate syntax and extraordinarily mannered 
mode of expression,” arguing that this “is a way of trying to see an object from all angles simultaneously, 
weaving a linguistic web so close-knit and fine-grained that it allows no scintilla of meaning to escape” (223). 
5I am thankful to Matthew Fellion for suggesting this point to me at the 2011 Narrative Confer-
ence. I am thankful also to Emma Plaskitt more generally for her encouragement in conceiving this project 
at Oxford in 2009. 
6Miller incisively discusses the ethical possibilities of stichomythia in late James, identifying “those 
repetitive stichomythias that are so important an ingredient in the grammar of dialogue in The Golden Bowl” 
(Literature 230). More specifically in reference to this “highly puzzling renunciation scene,” Wilkinson 
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posits that James’s “logic is difficult to follow, or accept, until we begin to see how much of the Kantian 
moral imperative is implicit in all of Strether’s crucial decisions in the novel” (167). 
7OED: Conscience (cf. the difference between I, “Senses involving consciousness of morality or what 
is considered right,” and II, “Senses without a moral dimension.” Also, as Warren’s previously mentioned 
study provides helpful background on conscience in James’s New England, Decker and Livingston offer 
insights regarding conscience in James’s adopted England.
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